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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents concur with appellants1 statement. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Respondents concur with appellants1 statement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondents seek affirmance of the summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents cannot concur in appellants1 statement of facts. 
Respondents recognize that on appeal from a summary judg-
ment the facts should be viewed in a light favorable to the 
losing party, but still the facts to be considered on review 
must be limited to those that were before the trial court. 
Appellants1 brief raises facts and issues of facts which were 
not. 
At pages 3 and 4 of their brief on appeal, appellants 
claim seven areas of misrepresentation. Only two of the seven 
are mentioned in any pleadings filed by appellants prior to this 
appeal. Those two claims are that the value of the rental equip-
ment was overstated, and that the monthly gross income of the 
business was not $8,500. 
-1-
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These two claims are stated at paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and 
7 of their complaint. (Rl, 2) 
While appellants touched on other matters in their depo-
sitions , they did not plead them, but stood on their original 
complaint as being their only pleading prior to this appeal. 
One of these two representations has changed form between 
complaint and appeal. This is the representation of gross monthly 
income of $8,500. Relative to this, the complaint says 
"7. That contrary to the representations relative to 
Exhibit "C" about the sales in each month that the 
sales do not equal the figures as indicated and repre-
sented and guaranteed in said representations but that 
defendants and each of them knew that the business was 
not represented and warranted . . ." (R2). 
This language has to be compared with the comparable 
matter as stated by appellants on appeal which was: 
"5. The monthly gross sales guarantee of $8,500 was not 
realized." (Underlining added) (Appellants Brief on Appeal, 
page 3) 
Respondents regret going into this matter in the State-
ment of facts. It is necessary in order to define the factual 
issues before the court. 
The brief on appeal of appellants apparently abandons the 
contention in the complaint that respondents' gross monthly sales 
were overstated at $8,500. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The portion of the complaint talking about a guaranteed 
future income, after the parties1 contract, has been retained. 
The trial court specifically stated as being the only 
issues before it: (R62) 
"Plaintiffs' claim misrepresentation as to the business 
valuation, and further as to the gross monthly income." 
Accordingly, respondents, in their Statement of Facts 
will confine themselves to the two aforesaid issues of whether 
there was a guarantee of future income to the sellers of $8,500 
per month, and whether the value of the business was misrepre-
sented. 
Going first to the matter of the guarantee of future in-
come, appellants' complaint states that appellants relied on 
respondents' written representations. These representations 
are attached to their complaint as Exhibit "C". (Representation 
of Income - R8) 
Respondent concedes he made the written statement. He 
claims it to be true. 
Appellant, Mr. Rich, in his deposition, admitted he knew 
what the actual earning history was. 
"Q. Did you ever look at the monthly statements? 
"A. Yes, Bob called me into his office and we went over 
the books for an approximate period of 22 months to get 
an average of what the business was pulling in." 
(R98, L15 - 23) 
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In regard to the future claimed income guarantee, while 
this is somewhat different than a representation of an existing 
fact, still Mr. Rich was questioned in his deposition as to 
what his understanding was in regard to it. 
"Q. This business of guaranteeing gross monthly sales 
of $8500, that wasn't put into the contract, was it? 
"A. No. 
"Q. You didn't require that the guarantee be a contract 
term, did you? 
"A. Excuse me? 
"Q. You didn't require that that be a contract term, 
did you? 
"A. I guess not." (R124, Lll - 19) 
To make sure of clarity in this regard, the matter was 
touched on again in Mr. Rich's deposition and Mr. Rich admitted 
as follows: 
"Q. Now, before the contract was signed, did you ask 
anything about having the contract include a guarantee 
on this $8500 a month? 
"A. I don't believe so. 
"Q. Do you recall Mr. McGovern talking about that and 
saying that if he worked with a new owner for a period 
of time, if he had control he might guarantee $8500? 
"A. Excuse me? 
"Q. That Mr. McGovern would have to be there on the 
premises to guarantee $8500? 
"A. I don't remember. 
-4-
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"Q. There was no way he would know what kind of 
control a new owner would pull in and what kind 
of money they would make, you know, if it weren't 
managed right, would he? 
,fA. I guess. 
,fQ. Have you ever asked Mr. McGovern to honor any 
kind of guarantee of any kind? 
"A. I don't recall. 
HQ. It is really not a part of the deal between you, 
is it? 
"MR. BROWN: Well 
"MR. KING: As you understand it. 
"THE WITNESS: The contract? 
"Q. (By Mr. King) The $8500 a month. 
"A. I guess not." (R138, L16 - R139, L16) 
In regard to the other matter, misrepresentation as to 
the value of the business, Mr. McGovern filed an affidavit 
supporting his motion for summary judgment (R4 3 - 46) which 
explained in detail how he arrived at the business valuations. 
Plaintiff filed no opposing affidavit. In sum, Mr. McGovern 
said the value of the business is not in the value of the equip-
ment. The equipment standing in the shop has only an invest-
ment value, as it is not producing income. Its value lies in 
the equipment being out in rental locations. He stated that 
the actual cost of the softener tank is $30. Freight and resin 
add about $32 more. There are other costs such as advertising, 
overhead and installation bringing the total investment to get 
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a unit on location to about $170. 
The tank then nets $6 per month in rental. Charging 
half of this to cost of servicing, leaves net; income of $3 
per month, or $36 per year, for the average tank. The tank has 
a life expectancy of 20 years, giving a net return of $720 over 
20 years. He rated the tanks' value on this basis, not on a 
cost basis. 
In sum, respondent, in his affidavit, admitted his claimed 
allegation of "estimated value" but explained exactly how he 
arrived at it and stood behind the "estimated values" as being 
accurate. 
Mr. McGovern1s affidavit corresponded in figures and 
amounts with his written representation (RIO). 
Appellants raise no issue that Mr. McGovern misstated 
the total number of units he had in the shop and on location. 
"Q. Did you ever ask Mr. McGovern how many softeners 
he had? 
"A. In stock for sale? 
"Q. In stock for sale, out on lease, whatever. 
"A. Yes, I made an inventory myself. 
"Q. That was before the sale? 
"A. Yes." (R101, L24-R102, L5) 
"Q. All right. And he went over with you briefly the • ; 
4 85 exchange rental locations. What is am exchange * < 
rental location? What did he tell you? 
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"A. He said he had a rental exchange tank in somebody's 
home and he had them in 485 homes, 
"Q. All right. And is that figure an accurate figure 
from what you found out since being in the business? 
"A. Yes. It seems pretty accurate." (RIO3, LI - 8) 
Appellants annexed to their complaint as Exhibit "E" 
(Rll), a "inventory sheet" in which they itemized and valued 
the equipment at roughly half what respondent claimed for it 
in his written affidavit (RIO). However, these two exhibits 
talk about different things. Mr. McGovern's written represen-
tation was titled, "Estimated Values". Previously explained, 
a value is different than a cost because of the income produc-
ing potential of the equipment. Appellants1 Exhibit is titled 
"Inventory Sheet", and at the bottom it states, "All prices are 
based upon cost as of 1974 if bought brand new!" 
Alfred Rich was questioned in his deposition as what he 
understood the meanings of Mr. McGovern's phrase, "Estimated 
Value" to be. 
"Q. When you talked to him, you got down to these esti-
mated values, didn't you? 
"A. We went over them, I believe. 
"Q. Okay. Tell me what he told you about them? 
"A. He told me what they were worth." (R104, L24 - R105, 
"Q. Okay, now tell me what your conversation was of the 
estimated values, rental automatics, $45,000. What about 
the conversation you had with Mr. McGovern? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"A. Basically all it amount to is he said this is 
what the equipment was worth." (R105, L21 - 25) 
Mr. Rich was asked further questions along this line for 
additional clarity. 
"Q. Do you remember sitting down with Mr. McGovern one 
afternoon before the sale and you said something like, 
'What is the business worth? How do we arrive at the 
sale terms?1 And he explained to you how he arrived 
at these estimated values? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Well, you were just talking about going through 
Exhibit D-2 with him. Now, when you got to estimated 
values, he told you how he arrived at values on these 
things, didn't he? 
"A. No, not that I remember. 
,fQ. Do you remember him going through, 'Here is how 
I make my rating,' similar to this Exhibit D-3 that 
he has written down? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Never at all? 
"A. No. 
"Q. But these are values. It says, 'Estimated Values,' 
not costs. Did he ever tell you what the cost per unit 
was? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Did you ever ask him? 
"A. I don't remember. (R106, L25, R107, LI - 22) 
Respondents' counsel was still concerned because of the 
reference to "cost" and appellants' exhibit which he had pre-
pared and which he attached to his complaint. Accordingly, 
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Rich was questioned specifically as to "cost". 
ftQ. (By Mr. King) Did you specifically understand 
that the estimated value on the units, like $45,000 
on rental automatics, that that represented the cost 
of acquisition of those things? 
,fA. What do you mean by cost of acquisition? 
"Q. How much it cost Mr. McGovern to buy them and 
have them installed. 
"A. He said that, 'This is what these pieces of 
equipment are worth.' 
,fQ. Right. Are worth. Now, this was explained to 
you by Mr. McGovern as being this is what they are 
worth? 
"A. No. 
"Q. As a part of the business? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Okay. Then did he say it was their cost? 
,fA. Yes. He said, 'This is what they are worth in cost.' 
He never went into any formula saying how be based this 
Well, I was buying an account with it. He said this is 
what the equipment cost. 
ffQ. I see. Did you ask him then how much it had been 
-depreciated; what its present value was? 
"A. No, I didn't. 
"Q. You are familiar with depreciation generally, 
aren't you? 
"A. No, I wasn't at the time and I am still not com-
pletely familiar. 
"Q. You know if you buy a car it wears out. 
"A. Yes. 
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"Q. This is depreciation. 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. If this is the cost of these things, what were they 
worth at the time of the sale? Did you ask him that? 
"A. No, I didn't. I don't recall. He said that, 
'These are what the cost of the equipment is.1 
"Q. And how old did he say the equipment was? 
"A. He didn't. 
"Q. What did you ask him about that? 
"A. He said that this was equipment that he had picked 
up over the years, he had started out with, that he 
had picked up during the process of the years. 
"Q. Okay. Now, the tanks have a limited life expec-
tancy, don't they? 
"A. I believe so. 
"Q. And the resin has a limited life expectancy? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. You wouldn't buy a used car for the new price, 
would you? 
f,A. No. 
"Q. Okay. Now, what was the conversation about, 
'Well, what are these things worth today then?1 
"A. We didn't have a conversation that way, I don't * 
believe. 
"Q. You never asked about it? 
"A. I don't recall." (R117, L25 - R120, L3) 
-10-
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In regard to appellant, Shirley Rich, in her deposition, 
she admitted that the McGoverns were strangers to her (R183, 
L17 - 18), and that she herself made no efforts of any kind 
to investigate whatever representations the McGoverns had made 
(R183, L18"- 20; R187, L18 - 20; R188, L3 - 8). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE LIMITED 
ON APPELLATE REVIEW TO THE 
MATTERS PRESENTED TO THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
In appellants' depositions, they mention areas of claimed 
misrepresentation which are set forth in the Statement of Facts 
in their brief on appeal• However, these matters simply were 
not plead anywhere at the trial level. 
"In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with par-
ticularity." R 9(b) URCP. Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, 
2 U2d 20, 268 P2d 988. Pace et al. v. Parrish, et al., 
122 U 141, 247 P2d 273. 
Plaintiffs complaint states (paragraph 6, R2) that their 
inventory of the property, as per their annexed Exhibit "E" 
(Rll), shows that respondents overvalued the business. 
-11-
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Paragraph 7 of the complaint referring to monthly gross 
sales states, ". . . the sales do not indicate the figures as 
indicated. . .," without further detail as to how the repre-
sentation is inaccurate. 
These are the only specific allegations that appellants 
have made. 
There is simply no detailing at all in the complaint of 
reliance on verbal representations, undue pressure to buy, 
business indebtedness, timeliness of accounts payable, value 
of accounts payable or company money losses, which are the other 
claims of appellants in their brief on appeal.. 
Respondents in their Answer stated as their first defense 
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action upon which 
relief could be granted. 
The effect of the affidavit of Mr. McGovern (R4 3 - 46) 
was to pierce the allegations, of the complaint regarding valua-
tion of the company. He stated that his representation was 
based on both the cost of the equipment and its income producing 
potential. As plaintiffs1 inventory annexed to their complaint 
specifically related only to replacement cost as of 1974 (Rll), 
it did not meet the "value issue". 
What position is a party in when he claims fraud, the 
opposing party admit the claimed" representations, but claims 
them to be proved true and explains exactly his basis for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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making them, and the complaining party does not rebut? 
This question can be considered on two points: 
First, the pleading requirements imposed on a party re-
sponding to a motion for summary judgment, and, 
Second, the obligation of a party to raise matters before 
the trial court in order to preserve them as issues on appeal, 
"RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
(c) MOTION AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(e) FORM OF AFFIDAVITS; FURTHER TESTIMONY; DEFENSE REQUIRED 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on per-
sonal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
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stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers 
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him." Rule 56(c),(e), URCP. 
Appellants did raise in their despositions issues of 
company debt and selling pressure. However, that would not 
put those matters before the court, as they were not plead ori-
ginally, and appellants never moved to amend their complaint 
to state them. While depositions have evidentiary value, they 
are not pleadings, and do not frame issues. 
Probably the closest Utah case is Dupler v. Yates, 10 
U2d 251, 351 P2d 624, in that it also involves a plaintiff's 
appeal from an adverse summary judgment on a fraud case, with 
depositions being used as part of the defendant's evidentiary 
basis for his motion, and defendant's affidavits, which pierced 
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the allegations of the complaint, being substantially unre-
butted. There, plaintiffs did file opposing affidavits, but 
these failed to close with the issues. 
The court summarized its holding, 10 U2d 270, as follows: 
"The record made by the defendant, in support of his 
motion for summary judgment, controverted the unverified 
allegations in the plaintiff's amended complaint and 
therefore, in the absence of counter-affidavits, no 
genuine issues of material fact were created." 
In accord see United American Life v. Willey, 21 U2d 2 79, 
444 P2d 755; Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 U2d 
274, 508 P2d 538; Rainford v. Rytting, 22 U2d 252, 451 P2d 769. 
Going on to the point of raising new matter on appeal, 
let us assume a party raises issues in his deposition which 
are not plead. It might be harsh to put the party out of court 
for that reason. However, depositions do net speak for them-
selves. Without a pleading, affidavit, memorandum or brief, 
how is a trial judge to know what portions of depositions are 
claimed as being causes of action unless he entirely reads the 
depositions himself, puts himself in the position of counsel 
for that party and himself frames the issues? That is not his 
function, but is the duty of the party. 
Matters must be brought before the trial court as a 
condition precedent to their being considered on appeal. Elg v. 
-15-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Fitzgerald, et al., Utah, filed March 8, 1976, No. 14169: 
KUTV, Inc., v. Motor Sales, Utah, filed February 10, 19 76, 
No. 13987; Law v. Smith, 34 U 394, 98 P 300; VanLeeuwen v. 
Huffaker, 78 U 521, 5 P2d 714; 5 AmJur 2d, Appeal & Error, 
§545, p. 29. 
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 U 2d 266, 272 P2d 185. 
"While it was the plaintiff's burden to make his case 
complete in all respects as regard allegations, proof, 
and findings, it was likewise the defendant's duty to 
inform the court if he had any objection or felt himself 
aggrieved or at a disadvantage on account of any such 
matters. By not making objection, he waived them." 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS THAT THERE 
WAS NO ACTIONABLE MISREPRESENTATION NOR 
H3ASONABLE RELIANCE IN THIS CASE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
For clarity, respondents have separated these into three 
subpoints. These are: 
1. Were there any actionable misrepresentations at all? 
2. Did appellants rely upon the representations? 
3. Assuming, for the purpose of argument, that there 
were misrepresentations, was appellants' reliance thereon 
reasonable under the law? 
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WERE THERE ANY ACTIONABLE MISREPRESENTATIONS AT ALL? 
Going first to the matter of the $8,500 gross monthly 
income, appellants have abandoned, in their brief on appeal, 
their claim in the complaint that before the sale of the busi-
ness to them gross monthly income was not $8,500. Alfred 
Rich admitted in his deposition that he had gone over the in-
come and outlay statements for the previous 22 months before 
the sale. The figures revealed by these books must have been 
favorable to respondent as nowhere in his brief on appeal nor 
in his deposition does he say they are false (R9 8, L20 - 25; 
R99, LI - 5). This leaves the grievance that he has stated 
in his brief on appeal, that there was a guarantee of future 
income after he took over the business of $8,500 gross monthly 
income and that guarantee has not been met. 
Is a seller's statement concerning future income that a 
buyer of a business might receive actionable in a fraud case? 
The general law in this area is very well settled. A guarantee 
is not the same as a representation made during negotiations 
for sale of a business. Appellants state in their brief on 
appeal that there was a "guarantee". However, the. facts, as 
testified to by Alfred Rich, are diameterically opposed to that 
claim. He specifically admitted in his deposition there was 
no guarantee of future monthly income at all. 
"Q. Now, before the contract was signed, did you ask 
anything about having the contract include a guarantee on 
this $8,500 a month? 
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,fA. I donft believe so. 
f,Q. Do you recall Mr. McGovern talking about that and 
saying that if he worked with the new owner for a peridd 
of time, if he had control he might guarantee $8500? 
"A. Excuse me? 
f,Q. That McGovern would have to be there on the premises 
to guarantee $8500? 
f,A. I don't remember. 
,fQ. There was no way that he would know what kind of con-
trol new owner would pull in and what kind of money they 
would make, you know, if it weren't managed right, would 
he? 
"A. I guess* 
ffQ. Have you ever asked Mr. McGovern to honor any kind 
of guarantee of that kind. 
"A. I don't recall. 
r,Q. It is really not part of the deal between you, is it? 
"A. I guess not." (R138, L16 - R139, L16) 
From the foregoing, it can be seen that any misrepresen-
tation as to future income is not actionable because it doesn't 
deal with a specific fact in being, and Alfred Rich admits it 
was not a guarantee. A . •• ' * 
On an equitable point, related here, Mr. Rich admitted 
that Mr. McGovern gave him assistance on request after Mr. Rich 
took over the business. 
"Q. He stayed on for three months, really, didn't he? 
"A. No. 
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"A. Oh, yes, he would come down if I called him up and 
asked him for some help*11 (R12 3, L2 - 7) 
Going now to the second area of claimed misrepresentation, 
that the business was not worth what Mr. McGovern had claimed, 
how do we close with this issue? 
Clearly, Mr. McGovern stated "estimated values", yet 
appellants don't deal with values at all, but claim lower "re-
placement costs" (RIO, 11). Is the value of home its cost 
to the builder? Is the value of a vending machine the same 
sitting in the businessman's store room as it is out on location 
in a business producing income? 
The point is, how can appellants say that respondents 
estimated values are false unless they use some kind of know-
ledgeable estimation of values themselves? If they had submitted 
data showing that the life expectancy of the machines would not 
average 20 years,that the monthly income did not average $6, 
or that the monthly cost of servicing did not average $3, then 
there might be genuine issues of fact. Unfortunately, the 
record is silent on such documentation by appellants. 
Even assuming that "cost" is the criteria, appellants 
have still failed to meet the issue. Mr. McGovern's affidavit 
explains how he arrives at a cost of $170 per unit. The soft-
ener tank itself costs only $30, with the other costs being 
freight, advertising, installation, etc. 
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The total cost per unit, which he could legitimately claim, 
could well be far beyond the costs as inventoried by appellants, 
because they simply don't explain what factors they used in arriv-
ing at their costs. Had they included all the items that Mr. 
^
 p McGovern included, and which seem to be a conscientious explana-
tion of ultimate costs, their figures might very well be in agree-
ment with his. 
The Utah law dealing with these hard to define representa-
tions of value has been well expressed in Stuck... v. Delta Land 
and Water, 63 Utah 495, 227 P 796, in quoting from Addison on 
torts (Wood's edition), 
"Generally statements as to value of property, real or 
personal, which the purchaser has an opportunity to inspect 
for himself, and in reference to which, upon reasonable 
inquiry he could ascertain facts upon which to predicate 
a fair judgment, are mere expressions of opinion, and 
however erroneous or false are not actionable." 
DID APPELLANTS RELY UPON THE REPRESBNTATIONS? 
One of the necessary elements of fraud is actual reliance 
on the alleged misrepresentations. 
As summarized in Pace v. Parrish, et al.,122 U 141, 247 
P2d 273, states, that the aggrieved party must act reasonably 
and in ignorance of the falsity of the representation, and did 
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in fact rely on it. 
Appellants have conceded that they did not rely on the 
$8,500 per month representation because they actual knowledge. 
"Q. Did you ever look at the monthly statements? 
"A. Yes. Bob called me into his office and we went over 
the books for an approximate period of about 22 months 
to get an average of what the business was pulling in." 
(R98, L20 - 25) 
A party can scarcely say that he relied in good faith ignor-
ance on matters where he actually saw the books. 
Appellants are in somewhat the same unfortunate position 
in regard to the valuation of the business. They admit they had 
been close enough to the books long enough to actually create 
their own inventory of units and locations, which corresponded 
with the representation made by Mr. McGovern (RIO1, L24 - R102, 
L5; R104, L14 - 17) . 
The question has to arise as to how, with this kind of 
access to the books, and the clear use he made of them in actually 
reconstructing the inventory, Mr. Rich was relying on Mr. McGover- -s 
statements. 
"Q. Did you ever ask Mr. McGovern how many softeners he 
had ? 
"A. In stock for sale? 
"Q. In stock for sale, out on lease, whatever. 
f,A. Yes, I made an inventory myself. 
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"Q. That was before the sale? 
"A. Yes." (R101, L24 - 25; R1Q2, LI - 5) 
"Q. Okay. Are all of these figures accurate; the 4 85 
exchange rental, 175 rental automatics, the 1 deionizer? 
Were these accurate? 
"A. They seemed pretty accurate." (R104, L14 - 17) 
37 AmJur 2d, Fraud and Deceit, §226 states, 
"The law will not permit one to predicate damages upon 
statements which he does not believe to be true, for if 
he knows that they are false, it cannot truthfully be said 
that he is deceived by them. . . . Accordingly, there can 
be no liability in fraud where the complaining party is, in 
advance, fully knowledgeable and apprised of those matters 
as to which the representations are alleged to have de-
ceived him." 
37 AmJr 2d, Fraud and Deceit, §230 states, 
"If the representee makes an investigation, however, that 
is free and unhampered, and he learns the truth, or con-
ditions are such that he must obtain the information he 
desires, or if the facts he seeks to know are as obvious to 
him as to the representor, and their means of knowledge 
are equal, he is presumed to rely on his own investigation, 
-22-
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and not on the representation. In such case, he cannot 
be misled by the representor." 
As to the matter of the investigation being free and unham-
pered, as referred to in the preceding American Jurisprudence 
citation, Mr. Rich admitted that the books were fully open, both 
to him, and his expert, Mr. Ott, his father-in-law, who is an 
accountant and professor. 
"Q. All right. Now, Mr. Ott had agreed to look at the 
books, hadn't he? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And Mr. McGovern had agreed to let him see them, 
hadn't he? 
"A. No. I don't recall Bob ^ rbally saying to Mr. Ott that 
he could see the books. 
,fQ. It was one of the things that was discussed, though, 
at the time of the earnest money: 'Now that you people 
are paying some earnest money, I am going to open my books 
up to you.1 That was discussed by Mr. McGovern, wasn't :'^ 
"A. Well, it was put down on the earnest money that we 
could see the books,yes. 
"Q. And he never refused that, did he? 
"A, No, I don't believe so." (R117, LI - 16) 
This is argument, and conjecture, but the statement of 
Alfred Rich that he couldn't recall whether or not Mr. Ott had 
looked at the books before the sale (R110, L19 - 23) is diffi-
cult to understand. If, as appellants contend in their brief 
on appeal, they were so pressured that they didn't have adequate 
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time to fully investigate the business, and Mr. Ott had no 
opportunity to see the books, Mr. Rich would certainly have made 
this point in his deposition. It would have been a powerful 
point in his favor. Conversely, if Mr. Ott had examined the 
books and failed to pick up discrepancies, Mr. Rich would have 
remembered this because his father-in-law had led him into grief. 
The remaining inference is that Ott did look at the books, the 
books were accurate, but Mr. Rich couldn't bring himself to admit 
it. If so, Mr. Rich clearly relied on the books and his inquiry 
concerning them. 
Mr. Rich's testimony on this point is as follows: 
"Q. Let's see. You don't know if before the sale was 
made whether your father-in-law had looked at the books? 
"A. I can't say for sure. 
"Q. You never asked him? 
"A. I don't recall." (R110, L19 - 23) 
ASSUMING, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARGUMENT, THAT THERE WERE MIS-
REPRESENTATIONS, WAS APPELLANTS1 RELIANCE THEREON REASONABLE 
UNDER THE LAW? 
If appellants relied on respondents' representations, were 
they reasonable in doing so? 
The basic duty of inquiry is well stated in Utah cases. 
For example, in Lewis v. White, 2 U2d 101, 269 ?2d 865 (1954), 
the court dealt with the case in which plaintiffs purchased a 
motel relying on alleged false representation as to installa-
tion, sewage disposal, and income from the property. The court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stated, 
,fNo matter how naive or inexperienced the defendants were, 
they could not close their eyes and accept unquestionably 
any representations made to them. It is their duty to 
make such investigation and inquiry as reasonable care 
under the circumstances would dictate . . •" Supra 104. 
Stuck v. Delta Land and Water Company, Supra, at 506,in 
accord, states, 
"If the plaintiff ought, by reasonable diligence, to have 
known the truth or falsity of the statements. ... He 
cannot by blindly believing what he ought not to have be-
lieved, or trusting where he ought not to have trusted, 
or shutting his eyes where he ought to have kept them open, 
charge the defendant with the consequences of his folly." 
This law is in line with the general authorities. The rule 
is restated in 37 AmJr 2d, §248, 
"The principle of the right of reliance is closely bound 
up with the duty on the party of the representee to use so* 
measure of protection and precaution to safeguard his in-
terests. It has been widely stated, as a broad generali-
zation, that the person to whom the false representations 
have been made is not entitled to relief because of it, 
if he might have readily ascertained the truth by ordinary 
care and attention and his failure to do so was a result 
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of his own negligence." 
The factual position of appellants is well summed up by th< 
trial court in its Memorandum Decision. 
"The deposition of the plaintiffs indicate that the plain-
tiffe had access to all the books and records prior to the 
time that this deal was consumated, had ample opportunity 
to check each item of valuation placed on the property by 
the defendants, and could have ascertained the true value 
if it was not as represented by defendants. 
"As to the income, plaintiffs must remember that, they in 
this connection, likewise had access to the books and 
records and could determine with ease what the gross and 
net income of the defendants was." (R62, 63) 
It should be noted that the Memorandum Decision is very 
careful not to say that there had been any actual false statemei 
The Decision viewed that as being secondary because of the ove: 
whelming weight of evidence dealing with reliance in view of th< 
open access that appellants had had to the Servisoft books. 
There are some areas where Alfred Rich said he wasn't in-
formed. However, his deposition indicates that he didn't inqui 
on these, and was not impeded nor rushed. For example, he stat 
in regard to the check registers, 
"Q. Did you ever look at the check registers before the 
sale was made? 
-2$-
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WA. No, I didn't. 
"Q. Did you ever ask to? 
"A. No." (R98, L15 - 19) 
He made no complaint about being rushed or pressured in 
regard to this. This was clarified by the matter of the check 
register being requestioned, 
"Q. All right. So let's see if we have the check register 
that was there. 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you can't recall if you asked to see it or not? 
"A. Right. 
"Q. But, specifically, it was never refused to you? 
"A. No." (R99, L14 - 20) . 
An important factor on reliance, is that the earnest money 
specifically allowed the right of examination of the company's 
books and Mr. Rich had an expert, his father-in-law, Mr. Ott, 
and while inferences can be drawn of various kinds from Mr. Rich's 
testimony, about what he remembers of what Mr. Ott did, this fact 
was inescapable: If Alfred Rich was inexperienced at all in busi-
ness, he had an expert available and the express consent of the 
sellers to let the expert see the books. If he chose not to use 
that expert, is any reliance he made reasonable? 
To illustrate, if I am buying a business, have a lack of 
business experience, and ask the seller to let my accountant 
r-27-
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see his books and the seller agrees, what complaint do I have 
of reasonable reliance if I don't use my accountant to do what 
the seller has allowed him to do? 
"Q. . . . As of January 8, Mr. Ott was free to look at the 
books, is that correct? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And so far as you know, all the books? 
"A.I imagine so. 
"Q. At any time did he do it? 
"A. I don't recall." (R95, L13 - 19) 
"Q. Well, you haven't had training in accounting, you 
haven't had a great deal of business experience. Your 
father-in-law is an accountant and a professor. Didn't 
you say, 'Will you take a look at these books and tell 
me what it is that I am buying; tell me if it is a fair dea! 
Didn't you have a conversation like that with Mr. Ott? 
"A. I believe so. 
"Q. He had put up $1000 of that earnest money, hadn't he? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. He was interested in it? 
"A. Yes. 
f,Q. But as far as you know, he never looked at the books? 
"A. I couldn't say for sure." (R109, L12 - R110, Li) *.; 
What is the position of appellant Shirley Rich? 
What was her relationship to Mr. McGovern? In her deposits 
she stated, 
"Q. Mr. McGovern was a stanger to you, wasn't he? 
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She made no inquiry as to whether Mr. Ott or Mr. Rich had 
looked at the books. 
"Q. Al told you that he had been looking at the books and 
the records and been working down there, didn't he? 
"A. He told me what Bob had said and Bob verified it up 
at Mr. Ott's house. I don't know whether I asked Al if 
he had seen the books or not. I really don't." (R185, L16-20) 
To make sure she understood the question, the point was 
recovered. 
"Q. Now, it was January 8th that the earnest money was 
signed and then it was the 19th that the contract was 
signed. Now, during that eleven days in between, do you 
know if Al or Mr. Ott went into the company books to find 
out everything? 
"A. I don't know." (R188, L3 - 8) 
In Stuck v. Delta Land and Water, Supra at 506, in quoting 
Black on Recision and Cancellation, §113, the court says, 
"It is a rule of great antiquity, and supported by a great 
body of authorities, that a person about to enter into a 
contract or assume an obligation should exercise reasonable 
care and prudence in the manner of accepting at their face 
value representations concerning the subject matter made 
to him by the opposite party; and, although the represen-
tations were false and fraudulent, and he was deceived by 
them and mislead to his injury, yet he cannot rescind or 
reputiate his contract on that ground, if it appears that 
he might have discovered the falsity by mere inspection of 
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the subject, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence 
in referring to sources of information which were equally 
open to him as the other party." 
Respondents believe that they come within the rationale 
of Fox v, Allstate Insurance Company, Supra, at 391, 
11
. . . The moving party has the burden of showing that 
there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and that 
he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but that 
when he has made a prima facie showing to this effect, 
the opposing party cannot defeat a motion for summary 
judgment and require a trial by a bare contention that 
an issue of fact exists. He must show that evidence is 
available which would justify a trial of the issue." 
In accord, Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 
11 U 2d, 1, 354 P2d 559. Transamerica Title Insurance Company v. 
United Resources, Inc., 24 U 2d 346, 471 P2d 165. Dupler v. 
Yates, 10 U 2d 251, 351 P2d 264. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the posture of the case as it was at the time 
the trial court ruled on it, its ruling was correct, and respon-
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dents pray it be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Attorney for Defendants-Respondents 
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